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ALTERNATIVES TO CUSTODY: EVIDENCE FROM POLICE FORCE 
AREAS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
JUSTE ABRAMOVAITE, SIDDHARTHA BANDYOPADHYAY, 
SAMRAT BHATTACHARYA1 AND NICK COWEN* 
England and Wales have some of the highest incarceration rates in the developed world. Recent 
policy reforms have focused on developing alternatives to custody that offer credible protection 
for the public, and justice for victims of crime. This article uses unique detailed panel-level data 
acquired from the Ministry of Justice for all Police Force Areas from 2002 to 2013 in England and 
Wales to analyse the effects of custodial and non-custodial sentences on recorded crime. Our results 
suggest that non-custodial sentences can be an effective alternative to custody at reducing property 
crime but their effect is less consistent for violent crime. This suggests that non-custodial sentences 
are credible, cost-effective substitutes to incarceration.
Key Words: panel data, incarceration, community sentences, sentencing policy, violent 
crime, property crime
Introduction
World-wide prison populations have increased substantially since the mid-1990s 
(Walmsley 2012). In England and Wales, the prison population increased from around 
17,400 in 1900 to over 85,300 in 2016, and in March 2017 the total prison population 
was just over 85,500 (Allen and Watson 2017). In 1901, there were 86 prisoners per 
100,000 head of population that increased to 182 per 100,000 head of population by 
2016. Incarceration is an expensive and socially divisive response to crime. Nevertheless 
its widespread use is defended not only on grounds that it is a fitting punishment but 
also in the belief that it reduces crime. However, its effectiveness is contested (Jolliffe 
and Hedderman 2015). Further, given its costs,2 even those who find custody a fitting 
response to crime may need to re-think their views. Indeed, finding effective alterna-
tives to custody is a key motivation for policymakers and researchers. The search for 
effective alternatives to custody has become even more urgent following the recent 
recession and the demand for governments to make cuts in public services, including 
*Juste Abramovaite and Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Department of Economics and Centre for Crime, Justice and Policing, 
University of Birmingham, JG Smith Building, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; Samrat Bhattacharya, Amazon.com Inc., Seattle, 
Washington, USA; Nick Cowen, Classical Liberal Institute, New York University School of Law, 110 West 3rd Street, New York, 
NY 10012, USA, nick.cowen@nyu.edu
1The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of 
Amazon. This work was conducted by the author prior to joining Amazon.
2The annual average cost for each prison place is £36,808 (figure for England and Wales, 2012–13, taken from Prison Reform 
Trust (2014)) while each new prison place is estimated to cost £119,000. By contrast, an intensive community order costs between 
£10,000 and £15,000. A Home Detention Curfew for 90 days is estimated to cost £1,300 compared to £6,500 for a similar period 
in custody (Heard 2015).
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the criminal justice system (Neilson 2010; Bandyopadhyay 2013). Although community 
sentences have existed in some form since 1907 (Solomon and Silvestri 2008), in recent 
decades criminal justice legislation has expanded the range of formal requirements 
available to courts when imposing them. Conditions now include regular supervision, 
electronic tagging, curfews, unpaid work and participation in drug rehabilitation pro-
grammes. Consequently, courts in England and Wales now have the power to sentence 
offenders to a range of non-custodial alternatives with varying levels of prospective 
deterrence, punishment severity, surveillance and associated rehabilitative support. 
This article offers an empirical analysis of how effective these alternative sentences are 
at reducing crime compared to custody.
The impact of incarceration on crime reduction is theoretically ambiguous as there 
are many counter-balancing effects through which prison can affect crime rates (Friehe 
and Miceli 2017). Theorized forms of crime reduction include incapacitation of individ-
ual offenders (to prevent further offences while in prison), specific deterrence (punish-
ing an offender in the hope of discouraging their individual recidivism), and general 
deterrence (discouraging a wider population of potential offenders from committing 
crime through the prospect and expectation of punishment) (Becker 1968; Levitt and 
Kessler 1999). However, there are also mechanisms through which prison is theorized 
to have criminogenic effects (Engelen et al. 2016). Prisons can prevent offenders from 
acquiring useful skills in legitimate labour markets; label offenders formally as deviant, 
marking them as unsuitable for reintegration into society; have psychologically destruc-
tive effects that prevents prisoners from returning to normal life when released; reduce 
access to and even destroy familial relationships and other sources of social support 
and integration; and generate a pro-crime environment where prisoner peer groups, 
and even prison officers, reinforce deviant identities and behaviours (Gendreau et al. 
1999; Cid 2009; Cullen et al. 2011).
Our contribution is to apply a unique panel of Police Force Area (PFA) level data in 
England and Wales in order to understand the impact of alternative sentencing poli-
cies such as community sentences on crime rates. This data set was requested through a 
Freedom of Information request. It details how many different sentences have been issued 
for all crime types each year from 2002 to 2013. This data set allows us to distinguish 
between the number of prison sentences (custody) and non-custodial sentences (com-
munity sentences, conditional discharge, fines and suspended sentences) imposed by 
local courts. We exploit the significant sentencing discretion traditionally granted to 
local courts (Brownlee and Joanes 1993; Tombs and Jagger 2006, p.806; Pina-Sánchez 
et al. 2017), and plausibly maintained even after the introduction of compulsory sentenc-
ing guidelines (Roberts 2011).3 This allows for a more detailed examination of criminal 
justice practice on PFA level crime than has yet been achieved in the United Kingdom. 
We analyse the effect of alternative sentencing methods on crime rates in PFAs by using 
sentence-type and offence-type conviction rates derived from data on total number of 
sentences across all PFAs each year. Our data include violence against the person, sex 
offences, robbery and property crime, allowing us to explore the effects of alterna-
tive sentencing on each crime category separately. Our model of using variations in 
3Pina-Sánchez and Linacre (2013) challenge this appraisal of sentencing discretion in England and Wales. However, they 
show that sentencing guidelines influence decisions in a consistent way but not that sentencing itself is consistent across courts.
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sentencing data across PFAs, rather than prison population, means that we can avoid 
some of the well-established problems with using prison population data (Spelman 
2008). An important caveat is that it is not possible to disaggregate all the mechanisms 
through which criminal justice might affect crime rates. As Durlauf and Nagin (2010) 
note of panel data approaches generally, ‘these studies are actually measuring a combi-
nation of deterrent and incapacitation effects’.
Previous research
Establishing and explaining a causal connection between sentencing policies, offender 
behaviour and community experience of crime is a key challenge in the study of crim-
inal justice. An array of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have examined the 
effects of short periods of custody on offenders compared to alternative sentences 
(Killias et al. 2000, 2010; Killias and Villetaz 2008). The results are not conclusive but 
suggest that prison for low-level offenders might have a small criminogenic effect. 
However, the nature of criminal justice policy implies that randomization can rarely 
be applied as part of a research design and only in narrow circumstances. Matching 
studies, therefore, allow for a much wider comparison of offenders. Smith et al. (2002) 
systematically review studies comparing the effects of community sentences with cus-
todial sentences. A small effect suggesting that prison sentences might be associated 
with increased recidivism was found. Further work tends to confirm this result that 
suspended or community sentences (including the use of electronic tagging) are asso-
ciated with lower levels of offending than prison sentences (Nieuwbeerta et al. 2009; 
Cid 2009; Wermink et al. 2010; Bell 2011; Andersen and Andersen 2014; Jolliffe and 
Hedderman 2015; Andersen 2015).
Matching approaches have become successively more useful for estimating the 
impact of differential sentencing on individual offenders, including long term impacts 
on criminal career trajectories. However, these studies have limitations. First, they rely 
on matching similar offenders who are given different sentences. The resulting sam-
ples, though much more extensive than the available study population in RCTs, may 
still not represent perfectly comparable offenders. Second, they may also not be typical 
of the offender population. It is difficult to extrapolate these individual-level effects to 
impacts on local communities that a criminal justice system is serving.
Drago et al. (2009) (cf. Drago et al. 2011; Drago and Galbiati 2012) offer an ingenious 
effort to deal with some of these challenges. They exploit a mass pardon in the Italian 
prison system that introduced a number of exogenous changes to a cohort of prison-
ers. They found that prisoners pardoned early, and so eligible for a longer sentence if 
reconvicted were significantly less likely to re-offend. They conclude that the prospect 
of prison deterred subsequent crime. The potential weakness of this analysis is that 
the prospect of a longer sentence is reverse correlated with the length of the sentence 
served so far (Durlauf and Nagin 2010). This means that it is impossible to say from this 
study whether the lower level of observed offending is due to less prison experienced 
already or the prospect of more prison in the future.
Not all of the theorized effects of sentencing involve only the effect on individual 
offenders. The use of district-level data, and especially panel data analyses, are import-
ant additions to our understanding of how the criminal justice system influences a 
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community’s experience of crime. Whereas studies of re-offending statistics can only 
capture the effect of criminal justice interventions on subsequent re-offending by indi-
viduals, panel data, in principle, can estimate the number of crimes prevented through 
incapacitation and general deterrence in a population of potential offenders. In the 
United States, several panel studies have been used to explore the effects of incar-
ceration on crime rates (Durlauf and Nagin 2010). The results have varied, with only 
some studies suggesting that prison population growth had a small deterrent effect. 
Vieraitis et  al. (2007) combined panel data of prison growth and prisoner releases. 
They found that prison growth was associated with lower crime but that releasing pris-
oners was associated with higher crime. They attributed this to the criminogenic effects 
of incarceration. Spelman (2013) attempts to disentangle the co-dependence of crime 
and prison population, by finding instruments for crime that predict changes in prison 
population, before deriving the effects of prison on crime. His results suggest that 
increased use of prison is crime-reductive in the United States.
Outside of the United States, recent panel data studies have associated higher con-
viction rates, higher detection rates and larger police forces, as well as various social 
factors including wage inequality, educational attainment, poverty and unemployment, 
with variations in crime rates (Witt et al. 1999; Carmichael and Ward 2001; Machin and 
Meghir 2004; Spengler 2006; Sabates 2007; Andrews 2011; Saridakis and Spengler 2012; 
Han et al. 2013). However, few non-US analyses have been able to explore variation in 
sentencing subsequent to conviction. An important exception to this is Bell et al. (2014), 
which exploits variation in sentence severity following the 2011 riots in London to iden-
tify a deterrent effect of harsher sentencing. Our approach, therefore, has the unique 
advantage of observing sentencing variation in hitherto unexamined detail.
Data
We obtained a unique data set from the Ministry of Justice through a Freedom of 
Information request detailing how many different sentences have been issued for those 
crime types in each year. In the United Kingdom sentencing is classified into custodial 
and non-custodial. Custodial sentences include immediate custodial sentences (both 
determinate and indeterminate length) and suspended sentences. Non-custodial sen-
tences include fines, community service, conditional discharge and absolute discharge. 
Our data include the total number of sentences issued to adult and juvenile offenders 
in each PFA every year for each sentence type as listed earlier. We use these data to test 
whether different sentencing (with a lag) has a different effect on crime rates. As we 
have data on sentencing for adults and juveniles separately, we analyse the effects of 
sentencing for both age groups jointly and then separately. Total crime committed by 
the juvenile offenders is lower than adult offenders. However, young people are over-
represented in the criminal justice system.4 Therefore, it is useful to analyse the effects 
of sentencing juvenile offenders on crime rates separately from adult offenders.
4In 2012/13 police made around 1.07 million arrests. 11.8 per cent of those (total of 126,809) were young people aged 10–17 
and for notifiable offences. In that year, young people accounted for 10.5 percent of the offending age population (aged 10 years 
or older) suggesting that young people are over-represented in the criminal justice system.
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Our data show us at each PFA5 in England and Wales (from 2002 to 2013) how many 
crimes have been recorded in four different crime categories—violence against the 
person, sex offences, robberies and property crimes. These four crime categories 
account for around 90 per cent of total crimes recorded across England and Wales 
between 2002 and 2013 (Appendix 1). The majority of offences were categorized under 
the property crime category. Table A2 in the Appendix 2 shows the composition of the 
property crime. The main categories are criminal damage, all other theft offences, 
vehicle thefts and burglary offences. For violent crimes, violence against the person 
accounts for the majority of the total violent offences recorded (Appendix 3).
Our dependent variable is crime rate per 1,000 people for each PFA for each time 
period. Our analysis includes violence against the person, sex offences, robbery and 
property crimes. As we are interested in how sentencing works and how alternatives 
to custody affect crime rate, we derive ‘sentence-conviction rate’ calculated by taking 
the total number of criminals sentenced to, e.g., custody in the particular year in each 
PFA and dividing that number by the total number of crimes registered in each PFA 
that year and multiplying it by 100 to derive a rate. ‘Sentence-conviction rate’ can be 
represented as follows:
 
‘Sentence - conviction rate =
Total Number Sentenced per Sentence Type
Total Numberof Crimes
crime type, year
crime type, year
* ’100
We do this for all crime types listed earlier. Our derived conviction rate for each sen-
tencing type (and for each offence type) is correlated with detection rate as only the 
detected crimes get sentences issued to the offenders. Conviction rate is sometimes 
used as a proxy for detection rate (Machin and Meghir 2004). Moreover, this type of 
conviction rate allows us to look into each sentencing type separately. Although we have 
sentencing data separated for adult and juvenile offenders and the effect of that can 
be captured separately, recorded crime rate has a victim but cannot be matched with 
an offender (in a large percentage of cases we do not even know who the offender is), 
and thus we cannot separate our dependent variable to crime rate for adult offenders 
only or for juvenile offenders only. Therefore, we run two empirical models—one with 
total sentence-conviction rate for all of the offenders and another one where sentence-
conviction rate is separated for adult and juvenile offenders. Descriptive statistics for all 
four crime types averaged for 2002–2013 period are reported in Table 1.
We include data on unemployment and proportion of youth population to con-
trol for socio-economic factors that could contribute to changes in crime rates. Also, 
we include a total of police officers’ salaries to represent the strength of police pres-
ence and might affect crime rates. Unemployment rate is defined as a proportion of 
unemployment benefits claimants to the total number of people in the workforce. We 
obtained unemployment figures from Labour Force Survey and Annual Population 
Survey. Unemployment data are available yearly at each PFA level. Police officers’ sala-
ries are the totals (in £’000) of how much each PFA spent yearly on police officers’ 
salaries. The variable youth population is defined as a proportion of young people aged 
15–24 years to the entire population. The data source is mid-year estimated population 
5We use data for all PFAs apart from the City of London because it is a small area that contains the Central Criminal Court of 
England and Wales (colloquially known as the Old Bailey) which tries cases from outside the area.
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by age and gender from National Statistics. The number of people aged 15–24 years 
has been calculated by aggregating each year group at local authority level and then 
aggregating into PFAs according to their geographic boundaries. Descriptive statistics 
for conviction rates and socio-economic variables are reported in Appendix 4.
Empirical model
The econometric specification of our main model is as follows:
 
CrimeRate = CommunitySent + Custody + Conditii,t 1 i,t -1 2 i,t -1 3β β β onalDischarge
+ Fine + SuspendedSentence +
i,t -1
4 i,t -1 5 i,t -1β β β6 i,t
7 i,t 8 i,t i t
PoliceOfficersSalaries
+ Unempl + Youth + + +β β σ εµ i,t
where i represents the cross-section unit of observation (in this case each PFA), t rep-
resents time, σ i is the unknown intercept for each PFA, µt represents year fixed effects 
to account for PFA specific year changes, and ε i,t is the error term. The explanatory 
variables, CommunitySent stands for the conviction rate for all offenders who get a com-
munity sentence, Custody is the conviction rate for all offenders who are issued a custo-
dial sentence, ConditionalDischarge is the conviction rate for all offenders who received 
conditional discharge as a sentence for the crime they have committed, Fine is the con-
viction rate for the offenders who were fined, SuspendedSentence is the conviction rate 
for all offenders who received suspended sentence. Also, PoliceOfficersSalaries stands for 
total cost of police salaries, Unempl for unemployment rate and Youth for the ratio of 
people aged 15–24 in the population.
We use PFA-level fixed effects to eliminate unobserved area-specific time-invariant effects 
and thus control for the average differences across PFAs for any observable or unobservable 
predictors, such as differences in size, characteristics etc. In that way, the fixed-effect coef-
ficients control for all the across-PFA variation and we are left with the within-PFA variation, 
which helps us greatly reduce the problem of omitted variable bias. We also include fixed 
time effects in our model as the year dummies pick up any variation in the outcome that 
happen over time and that is not attributed to our other explanatory variables.
For conviction rates we use lagged variables in order to minimize possible issues with 
the endogeneity that arises due to possible reverse causality between our dependent 
variable—crime rate—and conviction rate as both of them can have an effect on each 
other. Including a time lag on conviction rate minimizes the effect as crime rate this 
year cannot affect the conviction rate last year.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Dependant variables Mean Std. Dev.
Violence against the person (VATP)—rate per 1,000 people 12.18 3.08
Sex offences—rate per 1,000 people 0.96 0.21
Robbery—rate per 1,000 people 0.91 0.94
Property crime—rate per 1,000 people 58.27 19.24
Note: All crime rates are defined as the number of offences per 1,000 population; there is total 504 PFA—year 
observations in the sample (42 PFA by 12 years)
ABRAMOVAITE ET AL.
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Alongside our main model, we also test the relationship between crime rates and 
conviction rates for adult and juvenile offenders separately, keeping the rest of the 
model unchanged. However, since sentences issued to the offenders for violent crimes 
and property crime vary and there are more non-custodial sentences used for both 
adult and juvenile offenders for property crime offences, the econometric specification 
differs slightly between violent and property crimes as we include more non-custodial 
sentences for juvenile offenders in the latter. Both of these specifications can be found 
in Appendix 5.
Results
The empirical results of our main model are presented in Table 2 later. They are pre-
sented in elasticity form that was derived from level–level coefficients (Appendix 6)   
using sample means (with confidence interval reported at 95% level of significance) in 
order to make the interpretation easier.
For violence against the person offences the conviction rate for community sentence 
has a negative but insignificant effect of 0.04 per cent. However, the conviction rate 
for the custody has a negative and significant coefficient. A 1 per cent increase in the 
conviction rate for the custody would reduce crime rate by 0.2 per cent. Coefficients of 
the conviction rates for conditional discharge and suspended sentence are both nega-
tive but insignificant, and the coefficient of the conviction rate for fines is positive but 
insignificant.
Table 2 Fixed-effects regression models predicting change in crime rates, in elasticity form, 2002–2013
VATP Sex offences Robbery Property crime
Conviction rate for 
community sentence (t–1)
–0.04
(–0.11; 0.03)
–0.03 
(–0.09; 0.03)
–0.1*** 
(–0.15; –0.04)
–0.2*** 
(–0.3; –0.12)
Conviction rate for 
custody (t–1)
–0.2*** 
(–0.31; –0.1)
–0.12*** 
(–0.18; –0.06)
0.05 
(–0.04; 0.13)
–0.15** 
(–0.26; –0.03)
Conviction rate for 
conditional discharge (t–1)
–0.01 
(–0.05; –0.03)
–0.02** 
(–0.03; –0.001)
–0.001 
(–0.003; 0.005)
0.04 
(–0.02; 0.11)
Conviction rate for fine (t–1) 0.01 
(–0.02; 0.04)
0.0004 
(–0.001; 0.02)
0.0003 
(–0.001; 0.001)
0.06** 
(0.001; 0.12)
Conviction rate for 
suspended sentence (t–1)
–0.03 
(–0.07; 0.01)
–0.02 
(–0.04; 0.01)
0.03 
(–0.02; 0.06)
0.00008 
(–0.02; 0.07)
Police officers’ salaries 0.0008 
(–0.02; 0.04)
0.03 
(–0.03; 0.05)
0.01 
(–0.06; 0.09)
0.0007 
(–0.05; 0.05)
Unemployment –0.12** 
(–0.23; –0.02)
–0.06 
(–0.19; 0.06)
–0.39* 
(–0.82; 0.07)
–0.14*** 
(–0.26; –0.05)
Youth aged 15–24 –0.23 
(–0.79; 0.32)
–0.27 
(–0.93; 0.4)
1.4** 
(0.15; 2.62)
0.41** 
(0.002; 0.85)
Fixed time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 462 462 462 462
R2 (within) 0.71 0.4 0.51 0.9
Note: dependant variable is the crime rate per 1,000 people, CI at 95% reported in parenthesis. Coefficients 
are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, ***, respectively. Results are converted to 
elasticity form using sample means from the level–level results reported in the Appendix 6. VATP = violence 
against the person.
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For sex offences, the conviction rate for community sentence is negative but insig-
nificant as was the case for violence against the person. However, custody has negative 
and significant effect on sexual offences rate, suggesting that a 1 per cent increase in 
the conviction rate for custody would reduce crime rate by 0.12 per cent. This is simi-
lar to our finding for violence against the person. The effect of conditional discharge 
is different as for sexual offences the effect is negative and significant. A 1 per cent 
increase in the conviction rate for conditional discharge would reduce crime rate by 
0.02 per cent. Conviction rates for fine and suspended sentence are positive and nega-
tive, respectively, but both are insignificant.
For robbery offences, the impact of more convictions leading to a community sen-
tence is negative and significant. A 1 per cent increase in the conviction rate for com-
munity sentence reduces crime rate by 0.1 per cent. The conviction rate for the custody 
is positive and insignificant and that is the opposite effect that we found for the vio-
lence against the person and sexual offences. This suggests that sentencing types can 
have different effects on different crime types. For example, if community sentence 
is not an effective way to combat one crime type it does not mean that it cannot be 
effective for a different offence category. Other conviction rates for sentencing are 
insignificant.
For property offences, which is the only economic crime type in our analysis, both 
conviction rates for the community sentence and for the custody are significant and 
negative. A 1 per cent increase in the conviction rate for the community sentence would 
reduce crime rate by 0.2 per cent whereas a 1 per cent increase in the conviction rate for 
the custody would reduce it by 0.15 per cent. This suggests that alternatives to custody 
can sometimes be more effective than incarceration. Conviction rates for the condi-
tional discharge and suspended sentence are both insignificant. However, conviction 
rate for fines is positive and significant. A 1 per cent increase in the conviction rate for 
the fine would increase property crime rate by 0.06 per cent. Because it is an econom-
ically motivated crime, it is possible that paying fines reduces the offender’s income. 
Therefore, more crime could be encouraged thereafter in order to compensate for the 
financial losses fines have imposed.
Other explanatory variables—unemployment, police officers’ salaries and pro-
portion of youth in the population—were also included in our analysis. For violence 
against the person offences only unemployment has a significant effect of 0.12 per cent 
reduction if increased by 1 per cent. For sex offences all of the variables are insignifi-
cant. For robbery offences unemployment has a negative and significant coefficient, a 
1 per cent increase in unemployment reducing crime rate by 0.39 per cent. Also, the 
youth variable is positive and significant. A 1 per cent increase in youth population 
would increase robbery rate by 1.4 per cent. This is different from violence against the 
person and sexual offences. This may reflect the different economic motivations associ-
ated with robbery compared to other forms of violence. For property crime, unemploy-
ment has a negative and significant co-efficient, a 1 per cent increase in unemployment 
would reduce crime by 0.14 per cent. The youth variable is positive and significant, and 
it suggests that a 1 per cent increase in youth population would increase the property 
crime rate by 0.41 per cent.
Overall, our results suggest that alternatives to custody can be as effective in reduc-
ing crime rates as incarceration, for certain crime types. Given that the drivers of prop-
erty and violent crime may be different this variation should not be a priori surprising, 
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the literature does not find consistent impacts of law enforcement and socio-economic 
factors across crime types and as we have explained the net effect of custody as well as 
non-custodial alternatives comprise of effects that act in different directions (see the 
Discussion section).
Specifically, we find that alternatives to custody are effective for both property 
crime and robbery. It should be noted that although violence against the person, 
sexual offences and robbery are all classified as violent crimes, robbery in fact does 
not always contain a violent action by definition.6 Therefore, robbery can have an eco-
nomic motive similar to property crime. We can see from our findings that commu-
nity sentences have a larger and more significant impact on those two offence types. 
As discussed earlier, custodial sentences can affect offenders’ future employment, 
and therefore, income opportunities that might increase further economic motives 
for committing crimes in the future. It has also been found that robbery is often a 
group crime (van Mastrigt and Farrington 2009) and prison may therefore increase 
access to criminal networks increasing future offending opportunities. However, this 
is not the case for violence against the person and sexual offences where motives 
are not rooted in economic incentives nor is access to criminal networks as import-
ant. This can explain in part why we find that violent and sexual offences are more 
affected by custodial sentences (perhaps mainly through an incapacitation effect or 
through more intense treatment programmes in prison). Robbery and property crime 
can be managed at least as effectively by community sentences, though fines can be 
counterproductive as it increases the economic motivation to commit crime for peo-
ple at the margin. The ineffectiveness of community sentences for sexual offending 
may also reflect the inadequacy of community programmes for sex offenders during 
our period of analysis.
Table 3 reports our findings about the relationship between crime rates and convic-
tion rates for adult and juvenile offenders separately. As with the main results table, 
these results are presented in the elasticity form, which was derived from level–level 
coefficients (Appendix 7)  using sample means in order to make the interpretation 
easier.
The results for adult and juvenile offenders show that community sentences are more 
effective on adult than on juvenile offenders when it comes to addressing property 
crime. In our main specification, the effect was negative and significant for robbery 
and property crimes. However, while holding for the adult offenders for both crime 
types, the results lose significance for robbery for juvenile offenders. For fines it has 
exactly the opposite effect on property crime, suggesting the juvenile’s parent or guard-
ian paying the fine may be deterring the juvenile from further criminality. Results also 
differ when it comes to custody. In our main specification, custody showed a negative 
effect on violence, sexual offences and property crime. The effects for these crimes 
are the same for adult offenders. But for juvenile offenders only custody for violence 
against the person has any significant impact, and the effect on sex offences and prop-
erty crime becomes insignificant. This may reflect different motivations for adults and 
6‘A person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and immediately before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so, he uses 
force on any person or puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force.’ (Theft Act 1968, 
Chapter 60).
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juveniles as also the fact that juveniles make up a smaller part of the sample of offenders 
and may have less of an impact on overall crime.
On the other hand, the conviction rate for custody for adult offenders now has a 
positive and significant effect on robbery offences showing that a 1 per cent increase 
in the conviction rate for custody would increase robbery rate by 0.06 per cent. Once 
offenders are separated by adults and juveniles the alternatives to custody show more 
impact on the violent crimes. In the main specification, only custody was significant. 
For adult offenders taken separately, however, the conviction rates of the conditional 
discharge, fines and suspended sentence became negative and significant showing 
that a 1 per cent increase of those conviction rates would lower the crime rate by 0.05 
per cent, 0.03 per cent and 0.09 per cent, respectively. Overall, these results show, like 
our main model, that alternatives to custody can work effectively to reduce crime. 
In addition, adult and juvenile offenders react differently to changes in sentencing. 
Although none of the results became significant for juvenile offenders from what 
was already significant in the main specification, when considering adult offenders 
alone, more types of alternatives to custody sentencing were found to be significant 
for reducing crime rates.
Table 3 Fixed-effects regression models predicting change in crime rates, in elasticity form, 2002–2013, 
broken by adult and juvenile offenders
VATP Sex offences Robbery Property crime
Adult conviction rate for 
community sentence (t–1)
0.02 
(–0.05; 0.09)
–0.02 
(–0.06; 0.02)
–0.02* 
(–0.05; 0.002)
–0.16*** 
(–0.27; –0.06)
Adult conviction rate 
for custody (t–1)
–0.16*** 
(–0.26; –0.06)
–0.12*** 
(–0.17; –0.06)
0.06* 
(–0.01; 0.11)
–0.12** 
(–0.24; –0.005)
Adult conviction rate for 
conditional discharge (t–1)
–0.05** 
(–0.09; –0.01)
–0.01** 
(–0.03; –0.0003)
0.0015 
(–0.001; 0.004)
0.03 
(–0.03; 0.09)
Adult conviction 
rate for fine (t–1)
–0.03* 
(–0.06; 0.01)
0.005 
(–0.01; 0.02)
0.0002 
(–0.01; 0.001)
0.06* 
(0.002; 0.12)
Adult conviction rate for 
suspended sentence (t–1)
–0.09*** 
(–0.13; –0.05)
–0.01 
(–0.04; 0.01)
0.02 
(–0.02; 0.06)
0.02 
(–0.02; 0.07)
Juvenile conviction rate for 
community sentence (t–1)
–0.003 
(–0.06; 0.04)
–0.02 
(–0.04; 0.01)
–0.06** 
(–0.12; –0.03)
0.009 
(–0.09; 0.07)
Juvenile conviction 
rate for custody (t–1)
–0.03** 
(–0.06; 0.002)
0.01 
(–0.02; 0.04)
–0.02 
(–0.06; 0.02)
–0.02 
(–0.07; 0.02)
Juvenile conviction rate for 
conditional discharge (t–1)
–0.005 
(–0.04; 0.04)
Juvenile conviction 
rate for fine (t–1)
–0.02*** 
(–0.04; –0.006)
Police officers’ salaries –0.005 
(–0.02; 0.04)
0.02 
(0.03; 0.05)
0.02 
(–0.06; 0.09)
0.01 
(–0.05; 0.05)
Unemployment –0.12** 
(–0.23; –0.02)
–0.08 
(–0.19; 0.03)
–0.39* 
(–0.82; 0.07)
–0.14*** 
(–0.25; –0.05)
Youth (aged 15–24) –0.2 
(–0.79; 0.39)
–0.27 
(–0.93; 0.4)
1.26** 
(0.04; 2.62)
0.34* 
(–0.002; 0.7)
Fixed time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 462 462 462 462
R2 (within) 0.74 0.4 0.51 0.9
Note: dependant variable is the crime rate per 1,000 people, CI at 95% reported in parenthesis. Coefficients 
are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, ***, respectively. Results are converted to 
elasticity form using sample means from the level–level results reported in the Appendix 7. VATP = violence 
against the person.
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Robustness checks
Impact of financial crisis on the crime–sentencing relationship
For robustness, we check whether our model coefficients are stable when we consider 
the possible implication of the financial crisis in 2008–2009 given its adverse impact 
on unemployment and basic earning (Campos et  al 2010). Further, criminal justice 
agencies faced significant budget cuts and the Coalition government’s 2010 spending 
review called for police budgets to be reduced by 20 per cent (Millie and Bullock 2012). 
Thus, rising unemployment, falling incomes and lower police budgets might have well-
affected crime rates.
In order to test if our model is stable we include a dummy variable for post-recession 
years (2007<) and interactions of all explanatory variables with that dummy with the 
rest as before.
The recession dummy is set to be equal to 0 for years before 2008 and 1 thereafter, 
with the dummy variable representing a level shift change in crime, e.g., a positive coef-
ficient would indicate a level increase in crime in post-recession years.
Appendix 8 contains detailed results of the empirical models tested earlier. The 
recession dummy itself is positive and significant for all crime categories, suggesting a 
level shift as a result of the financial crisis. Most interaction dummies for various sen-
tencing types are not significant suggesting that marginal impact of various sentencing 
types does not vary across different phases of the business cycle. The signs and size 
of the main coefficients when compared to our main models for violent and property 
crimes do not change much.
Lagged specification
We changed the contemporaneous socio-economic variables in the main model to the 
one period lagged values of these variables. This specification addresses the potential 
issue of these variables affecting crime rate with a lag. The results are similar to the 
main results reported earlier (see Appendix 9 for detailed results).
Discussion
Our results suggest that although custody is an effective way of reducing crime for most 
crime types, it is not the only way to do so. In fact, custody can sometimes have a detri-
mental effect on crime. For example, robbery has a positive and significant relationship 
with the adult conviction rate for custody. This suggests that the criminogenic effects 
for adult offenders in custody for robbery might be stronger than for violence against 
the person, sex offences and property crime where custody had a negative impact on 
all the three the crime rates. Alternative sentences such as community sentence and 
conditional discharge also reduced crime rates for all three violent crimes except fines 
for adult offenders, suggesting that crime can be reduced by routes other than prison. 
In order to illustrate how a 1 per cent increase in the conviction rate affects the total 
number of offences, we have calculated the following for the adult offenders based on 
recorded crime in the United Kingdom in 2014. Our calculations also report upper and 
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lower bounds of the estimated numbers (based on the estimated confidence intervals 
at 95% level of significance) (Table 4).
We can see, for Violence Against the Person, more than 1,000 offences would be 
prevented if there was a 1 per cent increase in the conviction rate for custody (for 
adult offenders). However, almost the same number of offences could be prevented if 
there was 1 per cent increase in conditional discharges and 1 per cent increase in sus-
pended sentences. For robbery, no such impact from additional sentencing is found as 
we discussed. 98 per cent of sexual offence convictions result from crimes committed 
by adult offenders. Increases in both custody and conditional discharges prevent fur-
ther offences. However, a 1 per cent increase in the conviction rate for custody for adult 
offenders prevents over six times more offences than 1 per cent increase in the convic-
tion rate for conditional discharge.
Similarly, Table 5 illustrates estimated effects of sentencing 1 per cent more adult 
offenders to custody and community sentence in terms of prevented offences for 
property crime.
Although both community sentence and custody are effective at reducing property 
crime, community sentence is more effective.
Table 4 Number of offences of violent crimes could be changed by changing the type of sentencing  
issued by 1%
Offence type Violence against the person Robbery Sexual offences
Total number of offences recorded 
by the police (by adult offenders)
720,833 48,585 78,609
Estimated change in a number of 
offences after 1% increase in custody7
–1,153 
[–432, –1874]
+29 
[26, 32]
–94 
[–141, –47]
Estimated change in a number 
of offences after 1% increase 
in community sentence
–10[–24, 4]
Estimated change in a number 
of offences after 1% increase 
in conditional discharge
–360 
[–648, –72]
–8 
[–16, 0]
Estimated change in a number 
of offences after 1% increase 
in suspended sentence
–649 
[–937, –361]
Table 5 Number of offences of property crimes could be changed by changing the type of sentencing  
issued by 1%
Property crime Custody Community sentence
Estimated change in a number of 
offences (total offences 2,244,167)7
–2,693  
[–4937, –449]
–3,590 
[–5610, –1570]
Note: Estimated impact of sentencing 1% more offenders to each sentence type on number of recorded crimes 
in 2014 for adult offenders.
7All these estimated are based on the data for 2013–2014 crime trends from https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationand-
community/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/2015-04-23 and https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/399379/youth-justice-annual-stats-13-14.pdf
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We find that for some offence types, there are credible alternatives to custody that 
are either superior or approximately equivalent to a prison sentence in terms of impact 
on the local crime rate. However, what that alternative is depends on the type of offence 
and, also on whether the offender is adult or juvenile. The variation of the relative 
impact of these measures across crime types is not surprising given the diverse motiva-
tions and characteristics of different offender types. That the drivers vary across crime 
types has been theorized and shows up in the magnitudes of different determinants of 
crime types in the literature (see Loureiro et al. (2009) and Engelen et al. (2016) for why 
property and violent crime have different underlying motivations).
In terms of the impact of custody on crime, we have discussed several effects in the 
introduction, namely general and specific deterrence as well as incapacitation, which 
lead to a reduction in crime while prison is associated with criminogenic effects that 
act in the opposite direction. The magnitudes of these effects, in particular deterrence 
and criminogenic effects may vary by crime type and indeed by adult or youth. The 
effectiveness of alternatives to custody depends on the type of alternative and its inten-
sity. For example, property crimes are often economically motivated and fines may 
increase the economic impetus by lowering a person’s income and perversely leading 
to further criminal activity. On the other hand for juveniles, it is likely that the fines are 
paid by the parent or guardian who may have an incentive to try and stop the juvenile 
from offending. At the same time the criminogenic effects of prisons could be stronger 
for offenders convicted of robbery because of the greater likelihood of them meet-
ing potential future co-offenders while incarcerated. The ineffectiveness of community 
sentences on sexual offending may reflect the ineffectiveness of current regimes of 
treating sexual offenders in the community.
Limitations
We estimate a reduced-form model to show the effect of alternative sentencing types on 
different crime types. Although we provide a robust analysis of the problem, there are 
some limitations of our work. First, as we are estimating a reduced-form as opposed to 
a structural model, we suggest readers use caution before attaching a causal interpret-
ation to our estimates. Although a structural model is beyond the scope of this article, 
we take several steps to make sure that we are not estimating a spurious correlation 
between crime rates and alternative sentencing due to the presence of unobserved 
variables. Under the assumption of time-invariant unobservables, our fixed-effect esti-
mation strategy effectively removes the impact of such variables from our sentencing 
estimates. However, fixed-effect estimation strategy does not address any correlation 
that might still exist with time-varying unobserved variables. We also minimize the 
issue of time-varying unobservables by incorporating some of the key time-varying vari-
ables that could impact crime rate (e.g., PFA unemployment rate, PFA proportion of 
youths and time fixed-effects).
Second, our study is also likely to be impacted by data quality issues such as measure-
ment error and under-reporting of certain crime variables. For example, a measure-
ment error in the sentencing variables will lead to a downward bias in our fixed-effect 
estimates. Third, our study is conducted at PFA level. Because PFA is not a natural 
economic unit of analysis such as individuals or counties/districts, one concern is that 
our study lacks ecological validity. However, although PFA is not a natural economic 
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unit, from a law-order perspective PFA is an ecologically valid unit since crime-fighting 
resources are organized accordingly. Nonetheless, we should be careful not to extrapo-
late PFA level conclusions to propose policies that target specific individuals or groups.
Conclusion
This study explores the urgent question of whether and which alternatives to custody 
can substitute for incarceration. We examine England and Wales, a region with one of 
the highest prison populations in Europe and where recent policy has tried to reduce 
reliance on incarceration. We identify a hitherto unused data set on sentencing prac-
tice at the PFA level. We find that community sentences appear to be effective substi-
tutes for custody when addressing property crime and robbery, but not for other types 
of violent crime. Because custody typically costs more than alternatives (besides the sig-
nificant social disadvantages), our results suggest that there may be scope to provide for 
public protection through the criminal justice system more efficiently and humanely 
than the status quo. The results also suggest that policies implementing alternatives to 
custody in England and Wales may have already produced moderate success in terms 
of offering credible alternatives to sentencing judges, even though they have not yet sig-
nificantly reduced reliance on incarceration as a criminal justice strategy.
These conclusions are, of course, tempered with the caveats we mention in the previ-
ous section and we hope that this will spur further work using individual level data on 
specific interventions that will complement and enrich our analysis.
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Appendix 1
Table A1. Composition of total recorded crime in England and Wales 2002–2013
Composition of total recorded crime, England and Wales, 2002–2013, % distribution
Total violent crime 18.3
Property crime 71.7
Fraud 0.2
Other crime against society 9.8
Appendix 2
Table A2. Composition of property crime in England and Wales 2002–2013
Composition of property crime, England and Wales, 2002–2013, % distribution
Burglary offences 18.1
Theft from the person 3
Shoplifting 9.2
Criminal damage 27.1
Vehicle offences 19.3
Bicycle theft 3
All other theft offences 20.3
Appendix 3
Table A3. Composition of violent crimes in England and Wales 2002–2013
Composition of violent crime, England and Wales, 2002–2013, % distribution
Violence against the person 83.8
Sex offences 6.5
Robbery 9.8
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Appendix 4
Table A4. Descriptive statistics
Explanatory variables Mean Std. Dev.
VATP—conviction rate for community sentence 1.59 0.72
VATP—conviction rate for custody 1.65 0.56
VATP—conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.19 0.11
VATP—conviction rate for fine 0.2 0.11
VATP—conviction rate for suspended sentence 0.69 0.54
VATP—adult conviction rate for community sentence 1.12 0.53
VATP—adult conviction rate for custody 1.55 0.53
VATP—adult conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.17 0.1
VATP—adult conviction rate for fine 0.19 0.12
VATP—adult conviction rate for suspended sentence 0.69 0.54
VATP—juvenile conviction rate for community sentence 0.47 0.24
VATP—juvenile conviction rate for custody 0.1 0.06
Sex offences—conviction rate for community sentence 2.72 1.01
Sex offences—conviction rate for custody 5.73 1.77
Sex offences—conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.27 0.26
Sex offences—conviction rate for fine 0.28 0.34
Sex offences—conviction rate for suspended sentence 0.63 0.51
Sex offences—adult conviction rate for community sentence 2 0.78
Sex offences—adult conviction rate for custody 5.57 1.72
Sex offences—adult conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.24 0.23
Sex offences—adult conviction rate for fine 0.26 0.3
Sex offences—adult conviction rate for suspended sentence 0.63 0.51
Sex offences—juvenile conviction rate for community sentence 0.73 0.43
Sex offences—juvenile conviction rate for custody 0.17 0.18
Robbery—conviction rate for community sentence 3.33 1.86
Robbery—conviction rate for custody 11.58 7.03
Robbery—conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.04 0.16
Robbery—conviction rate for fine 0.34 0.31
Robbery—conviction rate for suspended sentence 0.76 0.95
Robbery—adult conviction rate for community sentence 0.7 0.75
Robbery—adult conviction rate for custody 9.87 6.6
Robbery—adult conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.02 0.08
Robbery—adult conviction rate for fine 0.02 0.2
Robbery—adult conviction rate for suspended sentence 0.76 0.95
Robbery—juvenile conviction rate for community sentence 2.63 1.65
Robbery—Juvenile conviction rate for custody 1.7 1.1
Property crime—conviction rate for community sentence 1.64 0.58
Property crime—conviction rate for custody 0.99 0.35
Property crime—conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.84 0.41
Property crime—conviction rate for fine 0.62 0.33
Property crime—conviction rate for suspended sentence 0.23 0.2
Property crime—adult conviction rate for community sentence 1.14 0.47
Property crime—adult conviction rate for custody 0.94 0.34
Property crime—adult conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.79 0.4
Property crime—adult conviction rate for fine 0.6 0.32
Property crime—adult conviction rate for suspended sentence 0.23 0.2
Property crime—juvenile conviction rate for community sentence 0.5 0.18
Property crime—juvenile conviction rate for custody 0.05 0.02
Property crime—juvenile conviction rate for conditional discharge 0.06 0.03
Property crime—juvenile conviction rate for fine 0.02 0.02
Unemployment 5.85 2.2
Police officer’s salaries 251.86 145.24
Youth aged 15–24 years 12.76 1.16
VATP = violence against the person.
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Appendix 5
The econometric specification of the model for violence against the person, robbery 
and sex offences is as follows:
 
CrimeRate = AdultConvictionCS + AdultConvictionCusi,t 1 i,t -1 2β β t
Adult ConvictionCD + AdultConvictionF +
i,t -1
3 i,t -1 4 i,t -1+ β β β5 i,t -1
6 i,t -1 7
AdultConvictionSS
JuvenileConvictionCS + Juv+ β β enileConvictionCust
PoliceOfficersSalaries + Un
i,t -1
8 i,t 9+ β β empl + Youth + + +i,t 10 i,t i t i,tβ σ εµ
where i represents the cross-section unit of observation (in this case each PFA), t rep-
resents time, σ i is the unknown intercept for each PFA, µt represents year fixed effects 
to account for PFA specific year changes, and ε i,t is the error term. The explanatory 
variables, CommunitySent stands for the conviction rate for all offenders who get a com-
munity sentence, Custody is the conviction rate for all offenders who are issued a custo-
dial sentence, ConditionalDischarge is the conviction rate for all offenders who received 
conditional discharge as a sentence for the crime they have committed, Fine is the con-
viction rate for the offenders who were fined, SuspendedSentence is the conviction rate 
for all offenders who received suspended sentence. Also, PoliceOfficersSalaries stands for 
total cost of police salaries, Unempl for unemployment rate and Youth for the ratio of 
people aged 15–24 in the population.
The property crime econometric specification is as follows:
 
CrimeRate = AdultConvictionCS + AdultConvictionCusi,t 1 i,t -1 2β β ti
+ AdultConvictionCD + AdultConvictionF +
,t-1
3 i,t -1 4 i,t -1β β β5 i,t -1
6 i,t -1 7
AdultConvictionSS
+ JuvenileConvictionCS + Juvβ β enileConvictionCust
+ JuvenileConvictionCD + Ju
i,t -1
8 i,t -1 9β β venileConvictionF
+ PoliceOfficersSalaries + Un
i,t -1
10 i,t 11β β empl + Youth + + +i,t 12 i,t,t i t i,tβ σ εµ
Besides the variables that are the same as the model earlier, we include the con-
viction rate for juvenile offenders who received a conditional discharge, labelled 
JuvenileConvictionCD, and the conviction rate for juvenile offenders who were fined for 
the property crime offences they have committed, labelled JuvenileConvictionF.
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Appendix 6
Table A5. Fixed-effects regression models predicting change in crime rates, 2002–2013
Level–level results VATP SexOff Robbery Property
Conviction rate 
for community 
sentence (t–1)
–0.29 
(–0.78; 0.19)
–0.01 
(–0.03; 0.01)
–0.03*** 
(–0.04; –0.01)
–7.07*** 
(–10.07; –4.07)
Conviction rate 
for custody (t–1)
–1.52*** 
(–2.33; –0.71)
–0.02*** 
(–0.03; –0.01)
0.004 
(–0.003; 0.01)
–8.56** 
(–15.56; –1.57)
Conviction rate 
for conditional 
discharge (t–1)
–0.43 
(–3.05; –2.18)
–0.06** 
(–0.11; –0.003)
–0.02 
(–0.06; 0.1)
2.92 
(–1.42; 7.25)
Conviction rate 
for fine (t–1)
0.77 
(–1.28; 2.82)
0.02 
(–0.02; 0.06)
0.01 
(–0.02; 0.04)
5.79** 
(0.09; 11.49)
Conviction rate 
for suspended 
sentence (t–1)
–0.55 
(–1.36; 0.26)
–0.03 
(–0.07; 0.01)
0.03 
(–0.02; 0.07)
5.74 
(–6.65; 18.12)
Police officers’ 
salaries
0.0004 
(–0.001; 0.002)
0.0001 
(–0.0001; 0.0002)
0.00004 
(–0.0002; 0.0003)
0.003 
(–0.01; 0.01)
Unemployment –0.26** 
(–0.47; –0.05)
–0.01 
(–0.03; 0.01)
–0.06* 
(–0.12; 0.01)
–1.43*** 
(–2.41; –0.45)
Youth aged 15–24 –0.23 
(–0.75; 0.3)
–0.02 
(–0.07; 0.03)
0.1** 
(0.01; 0.18)
1.88** 
(0.01; 3.75)
Fixed time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 
observations
462 462 462 462
R2 (within) 0.71 0.4 0.51 0.9
Note: dependant variable is the crime rate per 1,000 people, 95% level CI (in parenthesis). Coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, ***, respectively. VATP = violence against the 
person.
Appendix 7
Table A6. Fixed-effects regression models predicting change in crime rates, 2002–2013
Level–level results VATP SexOff Robbery Property
Adult conviction 
rate for community 
sentence (t–1)
0.23 
(–0.47; 0.92)
–0.01 
(–0.03; 0.01)
–0.03* 
(–0.06; 0.003)
–8.26*** 
(–13.29; –3.23)
Adult conviction rate 
for custody (t–1)
–1.26*** 
(–2.05; –0.46)
–0.023*** 
(–0.03; –0.01)
0.006* 
(–0.001; 0.01)
–7.53** 
(–14.74; –0.33)
Adult conviction 
rate for conditional 
discharge (t–1)
–3.29** 
(–6.22; –0.37)
–0.06** 
(–0.11; –0.001)
0.07 
(–0.06; 0.19)
2.47 
(–1.86; 6.8)
Adult conviction 
rate for fine (t–1)
–1.79* 
(–3.93; 0.35)
0.02 
(–0.03; 0.07)
0.01 
(–0.03; 0.06)
6.12** 
(0.24; 12.01)
Adult conviction 
rate for suspended 
sentence (t–1)
–1.62*** 
(–2.41; –0.84)
–0.02 
(–0.07; 0.02)
0.02 
(–0.02; 0.07)
6.34 
(–5.91; 18.59)
Juvenile conviction 
rate for community 
sentence (t–1)
–0.23 
(–1.35; 0.89)
–0.02 
(–0.05; 0.01)
–0.02*** 
(–0.04; –0.01)
–1.04 
(–9.75; 7.67)
Juvenile conviction 
rate for custody (t–1)
–3.14* 
(–6.48; 0.2)
0.06 
(–0.1; 0.23)
–0.01 
(–0.03; 0.01)
–26.17 
(–75.97; 23.63)
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Level–level results VATP SexOff Robbery Property
Juvenile conviction 
rate for conditional 
discharge (t–1)
–4.05 
(–41.94; 33.84)
Juvenile conviction 
rate for fine (t–1)
–72.47*** 
(–126.64; –18.31)
Police officers’ salaries –0.0005 
(–0.001; 0.002)
–0.00008 
(–0.0001;0.0002)
–0.00005 
(–0.0002; 0.0003)
–0.03 
(–0.01; 0.01)
Unemployment –0.26** 
(–0.46; –0.05)
–0.013 
(–0.03; 0.004)
–0.06* 
(–0.12; 0.01)
–1.41*** 
(–2.37; –0.45)
Youth aged 15–24 –0.19 
(–0.75; 0.37)
–0.02 
(–0.07; 0.03)
0.09** 
(0.003; 0.18)
1.55* 
(–0.01; 3.11)
Fixed time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 462 462 462 504
R2 (within) 0.74 0.4 0.51 0.9
Note: dependant variable is the crime rate per 1,000 people, 95% level CI (in parenthesis). Coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, ***, respectively. VATP = violence against the 
person.
Table A6. Continued
Appendix 8
Table A7. Fixed-effects regression models predicting change in crime rates with recession
Fixed-effects regression 
models predicting change 
in crime rates with 
recession interaction 
dummies, time trend, 
coefficients in elasticity 
form, 2002–2013
VATP SexOff Robb Property
Conviction rate for 
community sentence (t–1)
0.06 
(–0.03; 0.15)
–0.06 
(–0.14; 0.29)
–0.08* 
(–0.11; 0.01)
–0.22*** 
(–0.37; –0.06)
Conviction rate for 
custody (t–1)
–0.33*** 
(–0.45; –0.2)
–0.12** 
(–0.24; 0.24)
–0.39*** 
(–0.51; –0.26)
–0.02 
(–0.14; 0.09)
Conviction rate 
for conditional 
discharge (t–1)
–0.03 
(–0.07; 0.01)
–0.01 
(–0.03; 0.01)
–0.001 
(–0.01; 0.01)
–0.01 
(–0.11; 0.09)
Conviction rate 
for fine (t–1)
–0.003 
(–0.05; 0.04)
0.01* 
(–0.0003; 0.02)
0.001 
(–0.01; 0.01)
–0.04 
(–0.12; 0.05)
Conviction rate for 
suspended sentence (t–1)
–0.1*** 
(–0.14; –0.06)
–0.09*** 
(–0.14; –0.04)
0.01 
(–0.06; 0.08)
–0.07*** 
(–0.1; –0.03)
Police officers’ salaries 0.02 
(–0.02; 0.06)
0.03 
(–0.03; 0.08)
0.03 
(–0.06; 0.09)
0.02 
(–0.05; 0.05)
Unemployment 0.09 
(–0.3; 0.2)
–0.18** 
(–0.31; –0.03)
0.33 
(–0.27; 0.89)
0.002 
(0.51)
Youth (aged 15–24) 0.09 
(–0.3; 0.5)
–0.53 
(–1.34; 0.13)
0.58 
(–0.43; 1.6)
0.4* 
(0.91)
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Fixed-effects regression 
models predicting change 
in crime rates with 
recession interaction 
dummies, time trend, 
coefficients in elasticity 
form, 2002–2013
VATP SexOff Robb Property
Recession dummy 
(> 2007)
6.06*** 
(2.3; 9.81)
0.36** 
(0.01; 0.7)
0.65* 
(–0.13; 1.44)
30.16*** 
(8.14; 52.17)
Conviction rate for 
community sentence 
(t–1)*recession
–0.06** 
(–0.1; –0.001)
0.003 
(–0.05; 0.07)
–0.0002 
(–0.05; 0.05)
0.02 
(–0.07; 0.12)
Conviction rate for 
custody (t–1)*recession
0.11** 
(0.01; 0.2)
0.04 
(–0.04; 0.11)
0.25*** 
(0.17; 0.42)
–0.06 
(–0.13; 0.02)
Conviction rate for 
conditional discharge 
(t–1)*recession
0.03** 
(0.01; 0.05)
–0.003 
(–0.02; 0.01)
–0.0004 
(–0.01; 0.004)
0.02 
(–0.05; 0.08)
Conviction rate for 
fine (t–1)*recession
0.003 
(–0.02; 0.03)
–0.01 
(–0.01; 0.001)
–0.001 
(–0.01; 0.01)
0.06** 
(0.007; 0.12)
Conviction rate for 
suspended sentence 
(t–1)*recession
0.06** 
(0.01; 0.11)
0.05** 
(0.01; 0.1)
–0.01 
(0.07; 0.06)
0.1*** 
(0.06; 0.15)
Police officers’ 
salaries*recession
–0.01 
(–0.03; 0.04)
–0.004 
(–0.03; 0.03)
–0.01 
(–0.06; 0.05)
–0.01 
(–0.02; 0.01)
Unemployment*recession –0.1*** 
(–0.17; –0.05)
0.04 
(–0.08; 0.12)
–0.37*** 
(–0.68; –0.09)
–0.06** 
(–0.14; –0.004)
Youth (aged 
15–24)*recession
–0.24*** 
(–0.45; –0.09)
–0.27** 
(–0.51; –0.04)
–0.22 
(–0.8; 0.32)
–0.28*** 
(–0.53; –0.08)
Time trend –0.27*** 
(–0.4; –0.14)
0.01** 
(0.002; 00.02)
–0.07*** 
(–0.09; –0.05)
–3.46*** 
(–4.11; –2.8)
Number of observations 462 462 462 462
R2 (within) 0.73 0.30 0.60 0.91
Note: dependant variable is the crime rate per 1,000 people, 95% level CI (in parenthesis). Coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, ***, respectively. VATP = violence against the 
person.
Table A7. Continued
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Appendix 9
Table A8. Fixed-effects regression models predicting change in crime rates with lagged socio economic variables, 
2002–2013
Lagged specification, 
coefficients in 
elasticity form
VATP SexOff Robbery Property
Conviction rate 
for community 
sentence (t–1)
–0.04 
(–0.1; 0.03)
–0.04 
(–0.09; 0.03)
–0.11*** 
(–0.15; –0.04)
–0.22*** 
(–0.31; –0.12)
Conviction rate 
for custody (t–1)
–0.21*** 
(–0.32; –0.1)
–0.12*** 
(–0.18; –0.04)
0.04 
(–0.04; 0.13)
–0.14** 
(–0.26; –0.02)
Conviction rate 
for conditional 
discharge (t–1)
–0.007 
(–0.05; 0.03)
–0.02** 
(–0.04; –0.002)
0.001 
(–0.003; 0.005)
0.04 
(–0.02; 0.1)
Conviction rate 
for fine (t–1)
0.01 
(–0.02; 0.05)
0.006 
(–0.006; 0.02)
0.0004 
(–0.001; 0.001)
0.06** 
(0.006; 0.12)
Conviction rate 
for suspended 
sentence (t–1)
–0.03 
(–0.07; 0.01)
–0.01 
(–0.04; 0.01)
0.0003 
(–0.01; 0.06)
0.02 
(–0.03; 0.07)
Police officers’ 
salaries (t–1)
0.02 
(–0.002; 0.06)
0.03 
(–0.01; 0.08)
–0.03 
(–0.11; 0.11)
0.04 
(–0.03; 0.09)
Unemployment (t–1) –0.12** 
(–0.2; –0.005)
–0.12** 
(–0.18; 0.002)
–0.46** 
(–0.78; –0.07)
–0.14*** 
(–0.24; –0.05)
Youth 15–24 (t–1) 0.04 
(–0.76; 0.84)
–0.13 
(–0.8; 0.67)
2.18 
(–0.87; 5.08)
0.34 
(–0.22; 0.91)
Fixed time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of 
observations
462 462 462 462
R2 (within) 0.71 0.40 0.52 0.90
Note: dependant variable is the crime rate per 1000 people, 95% level CI (in parenthesis). Coefficients are 
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level and are marked *, **, ***, respectively. VATP = violence against the 
person.
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